The impact of structural context on local crime control strategies and media attentiveness to crime by Smith, Dani Allred
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
5-2001 
The impact of structural context on local crime control strategies 
and media attentiveness to crime 
Dani Allred Smith 
University of Tennessee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Dani Allred, "The impact of structural context on local crime control strategies and media 
attentiveness to crime. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2001. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/6384 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee 
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact 
trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Dani Allred Smith entitled "The impact of 
structural context on local crime control strategies and media attentiveness to crime." I have 
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend 
that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, with a major in Sociology. 
Neal Shover, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: 
Accepted for the Council: 
Carolyn R. Hodges 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Dani 
Allred Smith entitled "The Impact of Structural Context on 
Local Crime Control Strategies and Media Attentiveness to 
Crime." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation 
for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Sociology. 
Neal Shover, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation 
and recommend its acceptance: 





THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OK LOCAL CRIME CONTROL 
STRATEGIES AKD MEDIA ATTENTIVBKBSS TO CRIME 
A Dissertation 
Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree in Sociology 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
Dani Allred Smith 
May 2001 
ACDIOWLBDGBMEN'l'S 
Special thanks are due to my adviser, Dr. Neal Shover, 
the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Michael 
Benson, Dr. James Black, and Dr. M. Mark Miller, and the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Tennessee. Dr. 
Shover has been a source of encouragement and support 
throughout the entire time I have pursued this degree. I am 
especially appreciative of his advice, patience, and 
understanding. I feel privileged to have been mentored by a 
man of his scholarly reputation. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my 
husband, Ron Smith, and to my parents, Hollis and Frances 
Allred, my sisters, Marilyn Leggett, Ginger Ellis, and Lori 
Wade, my in-laws, Charles and Ann Smith and John and 
Charlene Grimes, my best friend, Jennifer Chlarson, and my 
colleagues at Lee University and Fisk University. My 
husband cha·~ffered me to Knoxville for classes and meetings 
and sacrificed summer vacations and hiking trips to support 
my pursuit of this degree. Our families and friends have 
offered both prayers and encouragement. 
The data utilized in my dissertation were made 
available by The Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. The data were originally collected by 
Herbert Jacob. Neither the collector of the original data 
nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses 
or interpretation presented here. 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
A neo-Marxist approach has been utilized to explain 
variation in local crime control strategies and media 
attentiveness to crime. The present study has argued that 
increased crime control and media attentiveness to crime 
result from perceived threats to the economic and social 
order by subordinate classes rather than from increases in 
the crime rate. The entire analysis has required two 
separate methodologies. First, a panel design and residual 
change regression analysis were used to examine 396 cities 
from 1950 to 1970. This analysis was used to determine the 
effect of changes in social and economic variables on 
changes in police size and police expenditures. The second 
analysis was based on only 10 cities. Multivariate 
contingency tables were constructed to analyze the effect of 
structural context on local crime control strategies and 
media attentiveness to crime. A dichotomous independent 
variable representing economic stability/low levels of 
perceived threat and economic decline/high levels of 
perceived threat was created for these analyses. Bivariate 
analyses were presented when there were too few cases to 
permit statistical control of the total crime rate. The 
analyses revealed that changes in social and economic 
factors significantly affect changes in police size and 
iii 
expenditures, the ratio of arrests to violent offenses, and 
the proportion of crime news on the front-pages of 
newspapers. 
Overall, the results of this investigation provide 
support for the neo-Marxist perspective. In particular, the 
findings confirm that structural factors, independent of 
crime rates, significantly impact formal responses to crime. 
Those structural factors which represent perceived threats 
to the social and economic order from disadvantaged segments 
of the population, especially nonwhites, have had the 
greatest impact. Limited support has been found for the 
measure of employment, civilian labor force, which is 
significant in the predicted direction only for changes in 
police size. Political decision-makers seem most likely to 
increase police size and expenditures in response to 
population decline and increases in the percent nonwhite. 
Ideological support for the efforts of political decision-
makers in times of economic decline derives from increased 
media attention to crime news on the front pages of 
newspapers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEM AND REVIEW OP LITERATURE 
Evidence of temporal and geographic variation in formal 
responses to crime is easily amassed. For example, Christie 
(1993) presents cross-national data from 1834 to 1990 which 
show that the incarceration rate varies substantially over 
time and between nations. The American experience is 
similar. The incarceration rate has more than doubled in 
the years between 1985 and 1998 (Gilliard 1999). 
Louisiana's prison incarceration rate ranked the highest in 
1998; Texas topped the list in 1997. Similar variations are 
found by examining changes in prison sentences. The Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (Brown and Langan 1998) has shown that 
the average prison sentence in the United States almost 
quadrupled between 1945 and 1994. The same publication 
reports that Southern states incarcerate inmates for an 
average of two more years than states in other parts of the 
country. Another cross-national study finds much longer 
prison sentences in the United States than in England 
(Langan and Farrington 1998). Further examples of temporal 
and geographic variations can be cited from comparisons of 
juvenile drug abuse and alcohol arrest rates, the number of 
prisoners supervised outside a jail facility, jail 
capacities, and death penalty sentences and executions. 
There are two contrasting explanations for variation in 
formal responses to crime. While some suggest that 
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political authorities are responding to the crime rate, 
others argue that political authorities are reacting to 
social and economic factors which represent a threat to the 
existing social order and/or elite interests. The 
neoclassical economic perspective on punishment interprets 
official crime control strategies as rational government 
responses to the level of street crime and to the publics' 
fears about crime (Shover and Inverarity 1995, p. 447). As 
crime increases, citizens demand more crime control services 
and support increased spending on crime control and those 
political candidates who are tough on crime (Liska 1987, p. 
69). Seen in this way, crime rates and community resources 
affect aggregate demand for crime control; the power to 
influence crime control policy is shared equally by all 
citizens through the electoral process (p. 70). The overall 
goals of these crime control efforts are deterrence and 
incapacitation. 
In contrast, the nee-Marxist perspective argues that 
official responses to crime are affected by economic change, 
independent of significant variation in the crime rate. 
Criminal sanctions are sketched as part of an overall 
strategy of social control directed primarily at members of 
"dangerous" or subordinate classes (Melossi 1989). 
Declining economic conditions often result in a labor 
surplus and thus a swelling of the lower class and 
underclass. Any segment of the labor force that potentially 
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threatens the status quo has been referred to as "social 
dynamite" (Spitzer 1975, p. 646). This term encompasses 
both economically disadvantaged segments of the population 
as well as youths and minorities. One reason may be that 
culturally dissimilar groups are perceived as threats to the 
social order (Liska and Chamlin 1984). Variation in crime 
control strategies thus reflect the distribution of economic 
and political power among competing groups (Chamlin 1987, p. 
836). These formal control strategies function to minimize 
the perceived threat to the existing social order and elite 
interests (Chamlin 1990, p. 485). 
The present investigation proceeds from a neo-Marxist 
perspective and argues that elites, fearing any surge in the 
lower class or dangerous categories produced from economic 
downturns, influence political decision makers to act to 
protect business interests and the status quo. These 
political decision makers develop crime control strategies 
to contain the threat posed by the lower and subordinate 
classes. They also focus media attention on crime in order 
to generate and rationalize public fear of crime and to 
garner support for policies to combat crime. Media content 
promulgates a message which maintains existing social 
relations and which legitimizes the status quo. Thus, 
economic and social context impact crime control strategies 
and the media agenda concerning crime. 
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Crime control Strategies 
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) were among the first to 
show that crime control strategies change in response to 
changing economic conditions. They argued that economic 
crises in capitalistic societies and resulting unemployment 
bring increases in incarceration. Punishment is reduced 
when the economy is strong and the labor surplus shrinks; 
punishment increases during periods of economic crises or 
stagnation and when the labor surplus is large (Hochstetler 
and Shover 1997, pp. 358-359). Other historical analyses 
also reveal that economic crises are accompanied by changing 
crime control strategies. In particular, Adamson (1984) 
attributes changes in hard labor and solitary confinement 
policies in U.S. prisons between 1790 and 1835 to changes in 
the business cycle and labor supply. This relationship 
between economic conditions and punishment has been the 
subject of many empirical investigations. 
Unemployment has been used as the sole measure of 
economic condition by several investigators (Greenberg 1977, 
Yeager 1979, Parker and Horwitz 1986, Inverarity and 
McCarthy 1988, Chiricos and Bales 1991, D'Alessio and 
Stolzenberg 1995; Michalowksi and Carlson 1999). 
Unemployment has sometimes been supplanted by the labor 
force participation rate (Wallace 1980) or income inequality 
(Jacobs and Helms 1997). Most often, unemployment has been 
supplemented with other economic variables such as 
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government revenue and industrial monopolization (Colvin 
1980, Jacobs and Helms 1999). 
The most frequently used measure of crime control 
strategies has been prison admission rates (Greenberg 1977, 
Inverarity and McCarthy 1988, Chiricos and Bales 1991, 
Jacobs and Helms 1996, Hochstetler and Shover 1997, 
Michalowski and Carlson 1999). The incarceration rate has 
sometimes been supplemented with per capita allocations for 
adult corrections and the parole rate (Wallace 1980), 
release rates (Parker and Horwitz 1986), court workload 
(Bridges et. al. 1987), and with measures of welfare (Colvin 
1980). Alternatives to the incarceration rate have included 
the number of indicted and convicted offenders and average 
prison sentence (Yeager 1979) and the pretrial incarceration 
rate for misdemeanors and felonies (D'Alessio and 
Stolzenberg 1995). 
Research has extended beyond measures of the prison 
population, particularly at the local level. Many of these 
macro studies of crime control responses examine the impact 
of structural variables on police. Table 1 provides a 
compilation of exemplary studies of local crime control. 
Police expenditures and police size are examined most 
frequently. Other local crime control strategies include 
the ratio of arrests to reported offenses and jail capacity 
and admissions. Several of these strategies have also been 
examined at the county, state, and national levels. These 
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Table 1. A Comparison of Exemplary studies of Local Crime Control 
Exem12la~ Unit of Time De12endent Inde12endent 
stugy Analysis Period Variable Variable 
Chamlin 1990 Chicago 1904-1958 police percent black 
expenditures arrest rate 
city revenue 
political environment 
civilian labor force 
unemployment 
0\ Loftin and Detroit 1926-1977 police size Part I crime 
McDowall 1982 
McDowall and Detroit 1928-1976 police size city revenue 
Loftin 1986 personal crime rate 
vehicle density 
percent nonwhite 
number of worker strikes 
Lizotte et. Chicago 1947-1970 police size percent black 
al. 1982 surplus labor 
average size of 
manufacturing companies 
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Table 1 (continued). A Comparison of Exemplary studies of Local crime control 
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include the ratio of arrests to reported offenses (McCarthy 
1991), total correctional expenditures (Jacobs and Helms 
1999), police size (Jacobs and Helms 1997), and police 
brutality (Holmes 2000). 
Social factors which represent some threat to the 
social order or elite interests have also been added to 
these analyses. Table 1 presents a wide range of structural 
factors which have been hypothesized to affect police size 
and expenditures at the local level. The most commonly 
included social factors are percent nonwhite, economic 
inequality, median income, percent poor, residential 
segregation, city revenues, and population size and density. 
Other studies with different units of analysis have also 
examined social factors such as poverty or income (Colvin 
1980, Bridges et. al. 1987, McCarthy 1991, Jacobs and Helms 
1996, 1997, 1999, Hochstetler and Shover 1997), or 
demographic factors such as race, age, or sex (Bridges et. 
al. 1987, McCarthy 1991, Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1999, 
Hochstetler and Shover 1997). Additional supplemental 
variables have included measures of family breakdown and 
partisanship (Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1997, 1999) and 
urbanization (Bridges et. al. 1987). Table 1 also shows 
that the crime rate is sometimes included in these analyses 
of local crime control strategies, but is disaggregated and 
controlled infrequently. 
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Most studies examine the relationship between economic 
conditions and formal responses to crime over time 
(Greenberg 1977, Yeager 1979, Wallace 1980, Inverarity and 
McCarthy 1988, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 1995, Hochstetler 
and Shover 1997, Jacobs and Helms 1996, 1997, Michalowski 
and Carlson 1999). The time periods for these studies range 
from 7 to 40 years; studies examining monthly data have been 
rare (D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 1995). Data have been 
gathered at many different levels-cross-national (Greenberg 
1977, Christie 1993), national (Yeager 1979, Berk et. al. 
1981, Inverarity and McCarthy 1988, Jacobs and Helms 1996, 
Lynch et. al. 1999, Michalowski and Carlson 1999), state 
(Wallace 1980, Grant and Martinez 1997), and county (Colvin 
1980, Parker and Horwitz 1986, Hochstetler and Shover 1997). 
As shown in Table 1, several investigations have focused on 
a single city over time. Most of the longitudinal studies 
compare, for example, police size at several points in time, 
but do not account for change in police size over time. 
Other studies of counties and cities have been cross-
sectional. 
Regression analysis has been utilized by most 
investigators who have explored the impact of economic 
conditions on crime control strategies (Yeager 1979, Wallace 
1980, Parker and Horwitz 1986, Inverarity and McCarthy 1988, 
McCarthy 1991, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 1995, Jacobs and 
Helms 1996, 1997, Hochstetler and Shover 1997, Michalowski 
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and Carlson 1999). However, the findings of these 
regression studies vary. For example, D'Alessio and 
Stolzenberg (1995) use an ARIMA modeling procedure on 
monthly, county-level data, but find no significant 
relationship between unemployment and pretrial incarceration 
rates. Residual-change regression analysis is performed on 
county-level data and is able to identify a small but 
significant and independent effect of changes in 
unemployment on changes in imprisonment; however, the best 
predictor of imprisonment is past imprisonment (Hochstetler 
and Shover 1997). Similarly, the variation in arrest 
certainty is explained more by the crime rate than by 
unemployment in another analysis (McCarthy 1991). The crime 
rate explains 27 percent of the variation; unemployment adds 
another 12 percent to the explanation. The amount of 
variation in the prison population explained ranges from 54 
percent when unemployment is the independent variable and 
conviction rate and average prison sentence are controlled 
(Yeager 1979) to 38.4 percent when the independent variable 
is labor force changes combined with other factors (Wallace 
1980). The variance explained in studies of local crime 
control has ranged from 28 to 84 percent (Liska et. al. 
1981) when the models include percent black and segregation 
and from 37 to 54 percent (Liska and Chamlin 1984) when the 
models include crime rate and income inequality as well as 
percent nonwhite and segregation. 
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Most investigators have employed control variables in 
their analyses. These have included the crime rate, which 
is often disaggregated into the property and violent crime 
rates (Wallace 1980, Liska and Chamlin 1984, Liska et. al. 
1985, McCarthy 1991, Hochstetler and Shover 1997, 
Michalowski and Carlson 1999), or some aspect of the 
criminal justice system such as non-correctional criminal 
justice expenditures (Wallace 1980), prison release rates 
(Inverarity and McCarthy 1988), and arrest rates, jail 
capacity, and the number of assistant state attorneys, 
assistant public defenders, and criminal filings (D'Alessio 
and Stolzenberg 1995). Also controlled are welfare benefit 
levels (Colvin 1980, Wallace 1980) and demographic or social 
variables such as geographic region, population size, per 
capita revenue, age, sex, race, income, and poverty (Wallace 
1980, Liska and Chamlin 1984, Liska et. al. 1985, Inverarity 
and McCarthy 1988, Hochstetler and Shover 1997). 
A review of 44 empirical research studies finds that 57 
percent of the studies reveal a positive and significant 
relationship between labor surplus and punishment (Chiricos 
and Delone 1992). More than 50 percent of the studies find 
a significant positive relationship when punishment is 
operationalized as prison admissions or prison population, 
when the data are national, regional, or county-level, and 
when the relationship has been examined over time. Studies 
that control for the crime rate and include measures of 
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social dynamite also result in more findings of a positive 
and significant relationship. These results reveal a clear, 
"direct and substantial labor surplus-punishment link that 
is independent of the mediating influence of criminal 
behavior" (p. 429). Past research "provides considerable 
evidence of a relationship between criminal justice policy 
and economic conditions" (Barlow et. al. 1995a, p. 191). 
And this research identifies specific avenues for future 
investigations, such as the inclusion of social factors and 
control of the crime rate, and recommends that future 
studies pursue other crime control strategies and collect 
longitudinal data on local areas. 
Media Attentiveness to Crime 
Fairly extensive research has shown that the news media 
disseminate a distorted image of crime. The media's 
portrayal of crime misrepresents the volume of crime, 
ignores white collar and political crimes, and stereotypes 
offenders and victims (Pritchard and Hughes 1997, Barak 
1995a, Chermak 1995b, Ericson et. al. 1991, Garofalo 1981, 
Graber 1980, Dominick 1978, 1973, Jones 1976). Violent 
crime, in particular, is overrepresented in the news media 
(Krisberg 1995, Gorelick 1989, Doob 1985, Surette 1984, 
Gordon and Heath 1981, Graber 1980, Dussuyer 1979, Sherizen 
1978). Thus, crime news does not accurately reflect 
official crime data (Sprott 1996, Jerin and Fields 1995, 
Marsh 1991, Windhauser et. al. 1990, Gorelick 1989, Ammons 
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et. al. 1982, Humphries 1981, Sheley and Ashkins 1981, 
Graber 1980, 1979, Jones 1976). Since the majority of 
crimes "are excluded from the public purview," the public 
relies on the media's narrow and distorted portrait of the 
crime problem (Chermak 1995b, p. 170). While the media 
effects literature regarding the impact of that distorted 
image on the public's perception of crime is not conclusive, 
there is reason to suspect that certain audiences (e.g., the 
elderly and females) may express greater fear of crime 
victimization or that audiences in general may fear violent 
crime much more than is warranted (Rountree and Land 1996, 
Marsh 1991). Researchers seem to agree that the media 
"influence public opinion by providing much of the 
information people think about and by shaping how they think 
about it" (Entman 1989, p. 361). Studies have shown that 
public perceptions approximate the media's depictions of 
crime (Sprott 1996, Loo 1995, Smith 1984, Sheley and Ashkins 
1981). Media-initiated and state-initiated news, rather 
than incidence of crime, are positively associated with 
public concern about crime (Beckett 1994). 
Journalists rely on government officials and police as 
their primary sources of information about crime. Police 
accounts, however, do not mirror actual crime; they are 
"cultural, legal, and social constraints produced by the 
police for organizational purposes" (Ericson 1991, p. 220). 
Criminal justice sources, including police and courtroom 
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personnel, "pass along crimes that reflect their own 
perspectives in which seriousness, dangerousness, and crime 
fighting are emphasized" (Chermak 1995b, p. 19). Several 
longitudinal studies of media coverage have not found crime 
news to be related to the crime rate (Barlow et. al. 1995a, 
1995b). The reliance of journalists on police and 
politicians as sources of crime news leads them to 
"legitimate institutions of social control by disseminating 
to the public insitutional rationales as facts of the world" 
(Fishman 1980, p. 154). An ideology of crime, representing 
an incomplete and fragmented depiction of crime, "helps 
secure power for a dominant class by diverting attention 
from alternative explanations for crime" (Gorelick 1989, p. 
423). The significant difference between crime news and 
crime statistics is indicative of an ideological emphasis on 
violent, individual crime, which "supports the interests of 
dominant economic classes by not questioning existing 
property relations" (Barlow et. al. 1995b, p. 9). 
The gathering of crime news is fundamentally the 
coupling of two information processing machines--the news 
organization and government (Surette 1992, p. 58). However, 
the media are in a subordinate role because their access to 
crime information is controlled by official sources. Barak 
(1995b) concludes that "crime reporting is shaped more by 
the way the system of law enforcement and crime control 
works than by official or unofficial crime statistics or by 
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audience demand" (p. 12). Crime news emphasizes the 
randomness and impersonal nature of crime violence which 
suggests that only the state and its agents of control are 
capable of confronting this violence (Chermak 1995b, p. 
141). Kappeler et. al. (1993) argue that the government and 
media have a monopoly on the myth industry in that they 
select and focus public attention on crime problems. The 
government has a "vested interest in maintaining the 
existing social definition of crime and extending this 
definition to groups and behaviors that are preceived to be 
a threat to the existing social order" (p. 6). Crime 
information "reinforces particular forms of social control" 
(Barak 1995a, p. ix). 
The media, although in an inferior position, are 
integrated within the power structure and take critical 
stances only when they can join an elite opposition. The 
media are components of the dominant power elite, in terms 
of their shared characteristics and backgrounds, corporate 
ownership of the media, and the numerous interlocks between 
the media and business. The media are subordinate to their 
official government sources, due to the routines of 
newsgathering which require credible, authoritative, 
institutional news sources. The media, because of their 
routine reliance on official sources and ties to the 
economic elite, reflect either the consensus of or range of 
conflict within the dominant elite. Therefore, media 
18 
content legitimates the status quo and promulgates a message 
which sustains existing social relations. The media are 
"hegemonic devices to serve a relatively small number of 
spokespersons, sources, and interests": the media "stress 
images and messages that reflect dominant beliefs and 
ideologies of that culture (Altheide and Show 1991, pp. 5-
7) • 
Media studies which lack social context have been 
described as media-centric (Ericson 1991, p. 220). Ball-
Rokeach and Cantor {1986) insist that the political and 
economic institutions of a society "set the stage for the 
nature of media content" (p. 14). Blumler and Gurevitch 
(1986) go further, arguing that economic and political 
domains structure media content (p. 67). Schudson {1986) 
believes that sociological research on the media should be 
"grounded in an understanding of social and political 
processes" (p. 47). Previous research has been criticized 
for abstracting the media agenda from its economic, 
political, and social context. Several media scholars have 
recommended a longitudinal study of the relationship between 
media content and social structure. 
Model and Propositions 
In spite of the breadth of the empirical investigations 
of the relationship between unemployment and punishment, the 
results of such studies often have been inconclusive. The 
percent of the variation in punishment explained by 
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unemployment has been less than 50 percent in many studies; 
factors other than unemployment are related more strongly to 
the imprisonment rate or other crime control strategy; and 
sometimes no relationship has been found between 
unemployment and formal responses to crime. The present 
study seeks to rectify particular shortcomings of past 
research. While previous studies have selected cities as 
the unit of aggregation, the longitudinal studies have 
examined a single city or fewer than 109 cities. Other 
studies of cities have been cross-sectional. The present 
study examines 396 cities over a period of three decades. 
Cities can be considered the most important political and 
governmental agents in law enforcement since local 
governments have the major responsibility for responding to 
crime (Jacob 1982, p. 6, 45). 
Previous studies of formal responses to crime have 
tended to focus on only one measure of social control--
incarceration rates or police size or police expenditures. 
This study seeks to remedy that deficiency by examining 
several measures of local crime control--police size, 
expenditures, and activity, and changes in city ordinances. 
The results of some studies which utilize convicted offender 
data have been inconclusive, perhaps calling into question 
the presumption that convicted felony offenders are 
representative of the labor surplus (D'Alessio and 
Stolzenberg 1995, p. 351). In addition, the use of 
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imprisonment or even pretrial defendants assumes that judges 
react to the level of social dynamite on behalf of elite 
interests and as members of the elite class to protect the 
status quo. Instead, local political decision makers 
respond to elite anxiety, and it is in the front-line of the 
defense against crime--police, city ordinances, and state 
statutes--where we see the evidence of their responses. 
Local police have the primary responsibility for enforcing 
city ordinances and state laws; thus, police represent a 
particularly local response to crime. An alternative crime 
control strategy is also needed because several studies have 
found a strong relationship between past incarceration and 
present incarceration levels, often stronger than the 
relationship between unemployment and incarceration (Wallace 
1980, Inverarity and Grattet 1989, Hochstetler and Shover 
1997). 
The selection of cities as the unit of observation has 
also affected my decision to replace incarceration as the 
dependent variable. The majority of the incarcerated 
population is held in federal or state prisons; only about 
one-third of the incarcerated population is held in local 
jails. The use of incarceration would also exclude the 
72,000 inmates in alternative programs outside of jail which 
local jail authorities supervise. The use of jail 
populations as a dependent variable is further complicated 
by the fact that those in jail may be awaiting arraignment, 
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trial, conviction, or sentencing. Juveniles may be detained 
in jail for mental illness or protective custody. At 
midyear 1998, 57 percent of jail inmates were unconvicted 
(Guilliard 1999). In addition, jails are primarily reserved 
for individuals serving less than a one-year sentence 
(although because of prison overcrowding, jails may also 
contain state prisoners). Furthermore, the survey of jails 
has only been conducted by the Bureau of Justice since 1992. 
In addition, past research often has been limited to 
only one measure of employment levels, either unemployment 
or labor force participation, and to only a few measures of 
social dynamite. The present study provides for two 
measures of employment levels--civilian labor force 
participation and number employed over age 16--and includes 
nine social factors which provide a strong measure of those 
segments of the population which may be perceived as 
threatening. Furthermore, previous studies have often 
selected static measures of the structural variables, which 
can lead to model specification bias (Chamlin 1989). The 
present investigation utilizes dynamic (change) measures of 
all variables under study. 
Another shortcoming is the exclusion of the ideological 
dimension in studies of the relationship between labor 
surplus and punishment. Previous research has been 
criticized for failing to consider ideological and political 
forces, as well as the criminal justice system and public 
22 
opinion (Garland 1990). The present study adds the 
ideological dimension by considering the impact of economic 
and social conditions on media attentiveness to crime and 
media support for crime control policies. Inclusion of the 
ideological as well as the economic and political dimensions 
may help the present study to avoid the criticism leveled at 
other investigations of overestimating the effect of 
economic factors. The addition of media attentiveness to 
crime may also minimize the moral reductionism of both 
Durkheimian and Marxian explanations for variations in crime 
control strategies. 
Given these shortcomings, I have elaborated a model of 
the relationship between structural context, formal 
responses to crime, and media attentiveness to crime. As 
depicted in the model (see Figure 1), certain economic and 
social factors which represent an increase in the proportion 
of those members of society who could be considered social 
dynamite, and thus a threat to the social and economic 
order, affect the level of elite anxiety. The specific 
economic factors are a decline in the civilian labor force 
and in the number employed over age 16; the social factors 
are represented by an unstable population which contains a 
large percentage of nonwhites and uneducated persons and of 
persons b~tween the ages of 15 and 24, and high levels of 
density, and with a low median income, and fewer families. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model of the Impact of Structural Factors on Political Responses and Media Attentiveness to 
Crime 
adversity, we presume that the dominant class feels 
particularly threatened and perceives the lower and 
subordinate classes as threats to economic stability and the 
status quo. The lower class is probably feared by the 
middle and upper classes at all times, but this fear 
increases when the size of the lower class increases. 
The economic elite presumably pressures the political 
institution when any factor threatens the status quo. The 
political institution seeks to maintain a climate conducive 
to business growth: therefore, political decision makers act 
to counter the perceived threat of the lower class. Thus, 
elite anxiety is translated into political action by members 
of the economic and political elite, who serve in the local 
arena as mayors, members of city councils, and state 
legislators, as contributors to political campaigns, or as 
advisers to political decision makers. At the local level, 
these actions will primarily affect police size, 
expenditures, and activity, and changes in city ordinances 
and state laws. Elite interests and threats to elite 
interests are measured indirectly with these structural 
conditions (Liska 1987, pp. 85-86). 
Proposition 1. During periods of economic decline (i.e., 
decreases in the civilian labor force and number 
employed over age 16), accompanied by high levels of 
social dynamite (i.e., increases in percent nonwhite, 
age 15-24, and uneducated; increases in population 
density and instability; and decreases in median family 
income and number of families), we suppose that elite 
anxiety will increase and will result in government 
policies which will increase the number of police, 
police expenditures, police activity (the ratio of 
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arrests per reported criminal offenses), and penalty 
severity. 
Also portrayed in the model is a relationship between 
the social and economic factors and between elite anxiety 
and the mass media. The media, as an economic enterprise 
owned by and with direct ties through directorships to 
members of the economic elite, are certainly affected by 
adverse economic conditions: their stake in the status quo 
is as great as any other member of the economic elite. 
Thus, media content mirrors the concerns of the economic and 
political elite and provides support for political responses 
to crime. The news media are in a subordinate position to 
the economic elite because of their position as a profit-
making enterprise dependent on advertising revenue and to 
the political elite because of their need for official 
government sources. Political decision makers serve as the 
sources for crime news and as the subjects of editorials 
concerned with government's response to crime. Therefore, 
media attentiveness to crime will also increase as the 
economy declines and the level of social dynamite 
increases. 
Prooosition 2. During periods of economic decline 
accompanied by significant numbers of social 
dynamite, elite anxiety will result in increased 
media attentiveness to crime. 
Proposition 3. The political responses, which presumably 
result from elite anxiety produced in the economic 
and social climate specified above, will be 
supported through favorable editorial comment. 
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Proposition 4. Political authorities will be the subject of 
most editorials about crime. 
The crime rate is included in the model as a control 
variable, as indicated by the dotted line between the crime 
rate and the political crime control strategies. In this 
model, the social and economic factors are predicted to 
affect local crime control strategies and media 
attentiveness to crime regardless of the crime rate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data for this study were gathered by Dr. Herbert Jacob, 
then a professor of political science and urban affairs at 
Northwestern University, as part of a National Institute of 
Justice funded project which investigated local governmental 
responses to crime from 1948 to 1978. Jacob collected 
baseline data on 396 u.s. cities with populations over 
50,000. Ten of these cities were selected for further 
analysis because of their range of values for political 
structure, fiscal strength, quality of life, and urban 
condition, as well as for race, age, median family income, 
police expenditures, and violent and property crime. Other 
factors which affected the final selection of the 10 cities 
were regional distribution, research capacity, 
accessibility, and prior research. The ten cities were 
Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Houston, Texas; 
Indianapolis, Indiana; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Newark, New 
Jersey; Oakland, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Phoenix, Arizona; and San Jose, California. In addition, 
Jacob conducted a content analysis of newspapers published 
in nine of the 10 cities between 1948 and 1978. Newark was 
excluded because of its wide readership of New York 
newspapers, which lack coverage of Newark. Data were also 
collected on changes in city ordinances and state statutes 
over the 31-year period. 
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As with most types of secondary analysis, the intent of 
the original study differs from the intent of this study. 
As a result, the conceptualization and operationalization of 
variables are not necessarily optimal for this study. Jacob 
was interested in the relationship between crime and social 
factors such as race and poverty and between crime and 
police size and expenditures. Almost no attention was paid 
to the economic factors which are essential to this study. 
In addition, several variables which would have been assets 
to this study were excluded. These include jail admission 
rates and the size and expenditures of all of the components 
of the local criminal justice system. 
Because record-keeping at the local level has not been 
consistently maintained over time, much of the analysis in 
this study is based on 10 U.S. cities over a 31-year time 
period. This small sample size limits the types of analyses 
that can be performed. Thus, the case-study approach has 
been selected to test the entire theoretical model. The 
case-study approach has been used to compare criminal 
justice systems (Brereton and Casper 1981-82, Welsh and 
Pontell 1991) and to assess theoretical models (Castallano 
and McGarrell 1991). The analysis of the 10 sample cities 
provides for an intensive and historical specificity which 
may avoid the criticism of superficiality leveled at some 
studies. 
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The limited generalizability of findings based on 10 
cities is a potential problem. The entire model can only be 
tested using the data on 10 cities. Although these data are 
extensive, the small number of cities calls into question 
the representativeness of the findings. Another limitation 
derives from the time period of the original study, 1948-
1978. Data representing 1978 to the present, especially 
annual data, would be a welcome addition to this analysis. 
However, this investigation provides a foundation for 
continuing the analysis into the present. 
Independent variables 
Specific measures of economic and social context are 
available in baseline data which Jacob collected from census 
publications. The specific economic and social factors are 
listed in the model contained in Chapter 1. All of these 
factors are available for the 396 cities for the years 1950, 
1960 and 1970. 
Economic Factors 
civilian labor force 
number employed over age 16 
Social Factors 
percent nonwhite 
percent age 15-24 
population density (population per square mile) 
population growth (percent population change) 
median family income (standardized in 1967 dollars) 
number of families 
percent uneducated (percent 25 years and older with less 
than a fifth grade education) 
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These economic and social factors are also used to 
construct a dichotomous independent variable representing 
structural context. The attributes of the structural 
context variable are economic stability/low levels of social 
dynamite and economic decline/high levels of social 
dynamite. The dichotomous independent variable is used when 
analyzing the 10 cities. 
Dependent variables 
The crime control strategies examined in this study are 
police size, expenditures, and activity and changes in 
penalty severity. The number of police officers per 1,000 
population and per capita police expenditures (standardized 
in 1967 dollars) provide measures of formal responses to 
crime for the 396 cities. The ratio of arrests to reported 
criminal offenses (violent--homicide, robbery, assault--and 
property--burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft) serve as a 
measure of intensity of police activity for the 10 cities. 
Data on the number of police officers, arrests, and criminal 
offenses were obtained from the Uniform Crime Report: data 
on police expenditures were obtained from a census 
publication. In addition, the changes in city ordinances 
(in the 10 cities) and in state laws (in the states 
represented by the 10 cities) for 11 offense types permit 
the examination of changes in penalty severity (increase, no 
change, decrease). The specific ordinances and statutes 
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were coded by Jacob. All of these variables are available 
for the 1948-1978 time period. 
To investigate the impact of economic and social 
factors on the media, two measures of media attentiveness to 
crime are utilized. Crime news is a staple of typical news 
coverage (Berkowitz 1997, Chermak 1995a, 1995b, Erickson et. 
al. 1991, Kaniss 1991, Graber 1980, 1979, Dominick 1978). 
Newspapers were chosen to represent the media because they 
are the most important news source at the local level 
(Reagan and Ducey 1983, Bogart 1984, Latimer and Cotter 
1985). Newspapers are "America's premier source of public 
affairs information" (Robinson and Levy 1996, p. 135). The 
content of the front-page and editorial pages of the local 
newspapers in 9 of the 10 cities for the 31-year period were 
coded as part of the Jacob (1982) study. A randomly 
constructed week for each four-month period resulted in 21 
issues per city; the proportion of circulation was 
considered in selecting from multiple newspapers in the same 
city (p. 18). The reliability of the sample size was at the 
95 percent level of confidence. Media attentiveness to 
crime is operationalized as the proportion of crime news to 
total front-page news and of editorial content concerning 
crime issues to total editorial content. An additional 
measure examines the valence or position of editorial 
comment (critical, favorable, neutral) concerning crime and 
the subject of that comment. 
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control variables 
Nee-Marxist approaches to punishment assume that the 
effect of economic and social factors on formal responses to 
crime are independent of the level of crime; therefore, the 
crime rate will be controlled in this analysis. It also 
seems important to control for crime given the results of 
past research discussed above. Yearly data on the total, 
violent, and property crime rate were obtained from the 
Uniform Crime Report for the 396 cities from 1948 to 1978. 
Analysis Plans 
Two methodologies were used to analyze the impact of 
structural factors on local crime control strategies. The 
combination of time-series and case-study analyses of 
longitudinal data on U.S. cities permits the assessment of 
the impact of economic and social context on local 
government's response to crime and local newspapers' 
attentiveness to crime and support for crime control 
policies. The first methodology is a panel design which 
compares the 396 cities at three points in time (1950, 1960, 
and 1970). This design controls for variation between 
cities as well as for trend effects (Parker and Horwitz 
1986, Hochstetler and Shover 1997). Residual-change 
regression analysis is used to eliminate the effect of 
initial or previous values of the independent and dependent 
variables on changes in those variables. The procedure also 
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controls for trend effects common to all cities (Hochstetler 
and Shover 1997, p. 363). Both the panel design and 
analysis of change scores provide for a dynamic, rather than 
a static, measure of the variables under study (Chamlin 
1989). The selection of cities as the unit of observation 
makes it possible to avoid the difficulties associated with 
larger geographic units, such as the masking of unique 
variations due to the heterogeneity of the larger unit, the 
canceling of measurement errors between subunits, and the 
rising of national series over time (Wallace 1980, Galster 
and Scaturo 1985, Chiricos and Delone 1992, Hochstetler and 
Shover 1997). 
A regression analysis is performed on the 396 cities. 
Residual-change regression analysis permits an examination 
of the impact of changes in the economic and social factors 
on changes in police size and expenditures, controlling for 
the crime rate. Change in these factors from 1950 to 1960 
and from 1960 to 1970 can be examined by regressing the 
variables on their previous level to derive a predicted 
value and then subtracting the predicted from the observed 
value (Hochstetler and Shover, p. 363). Thus, the residual-
change scores for police size and expenditures will be 
regressed on the residual-change scores for the specific 
variables identified as economic and social factors (p. 
363). Change scores have been shown to be highly reliable 
when the intent is to assess the effect of the independent 
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variable on subsequent (Time 2) levels of the dependent 
variable with the initial (Time 1) level of variability in 
the dependent variable controlled (Allison 1990). This 
analysis tests the portion of the model dealing with the 
influence of economic and social factors on two of the 
variables which measure the actions of political decision 
makers in response to elite anxiety. 
The second methodology utilizes a case-study approach 
to analyze the 10 cities and to test the entire theoretical 
model. structural context, represented here by economic and 
social factors, can be distinguished by following a 
procedure used by Barlow et. al. (1995a) and Hagan and 
Bernstein (1979). Descriptive data will be relied upon to 
compare the 10 cities along a dichotomously created 
independent variable representing economic decline/high 
levels of social dynamite and economic stability/low or 
stable levels of social dynamite. Both crime control 
strategies and media content are compared for the two time 
periods. The level of crime is controlled to ensure that it 
is economic and social context, not simply increasing or 
decreasing crime rates, which affect formal responses to 
crime and media content. Multivariate contingency tables 
are presented to reflect the impact of structural context on 
the law enforcement variables and the media agenda 
concerning crime, while controlling for crime. Chi-square 




The results of the analytical procedures detailed in 
the previous section follow. The findings from the 
residual-change regression analyses of changes in police 
size and in police expenditures for the 396 cities are 
presented first. The impact of changes in nine structural 
factors on changes in police size and in police expenditures 
over two decades is evaluated. The outcome of the 
multivariate contingency analyses of police size, 
expenditures, and activity in the 10 sample cities is 
described next. The multivariate analyses compare the law 
enforcement variables in two economic periods while 
controlling for the crime rate. Additional analyses of 
police activity and penalty severity indicate whether there 
are significant differences between periods of economic 
decline and economic stability. Further multivariate 
analyses examine the variation in media attentiveness to 
crime in the two periods. 
Regression Analyses 
Residual-change regression scores have been calculated 
for the social and economic factors, for the property and 
violent crime rates, and for police size and police 
expenditures. The change scores are the difference between 
observed and predicted values for each variable over two 
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time-periods: 1950 to 1960 and 1960 to 1970. Therefore, 
the 1950-1960 change score for the dependent variable police 
size represents the difference between the actual police 
size in 1960 and the police size predicted for 1960 based on 
known police size in 1950. The change scores are entered 
into a regression model, which displays the direct effect of 
changes in social and economic factors on changes in police 
size and in police expenditures. The zero-order correlation 
between changes in the two measures of employment are quite 
high (r = .72 for 1950-1960; r = .97 for 1960-1970); 
therefore, number employed over age 16 has been removed from 
the analysis. For all other variables, collinearity 
diagnostics reveal minimal problems with multicollinearity 
(tolerance levels are sufficiently high). 
Included in each summary regression table are the 
unstandardized coefficients and the standard error for those 
coefficients for each independent and control variable. The 
final column contains the beta coefficient for each variable 
and asterisks are used to designate those beta values which 
are significant. The significance is tested by the t 
statistic. The beta coefficients "represent the relative 
amount of contribution of that variable, after contributions 
of the other variables included in the regression equation 
are taken into account" (Loether and McTavish, 1974, p. 
313). Thus, the beta coefficient values statistically 
control for the other variables (p. 313). The beta 
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coefficient permits the comparison of the relative 
contribution of each variable to the prediction of the 
dependent variable (p. 314). 
Separate regression analyses were performed for changes 
in police size and in police expenditures for each time 
period (1950 to 1960 and 1960 to 1970). The explained 
variances are higher for the 1950 to 1960 models for both 
police size and police expenditures (R2 = .342 and R2 = 
.386, respectively) than for the 1960 to 1970 models (R2 = 
.331 and R2 = .272, respectively). The combined factors 
account for 34 percent of the variation in police size and 
39 percent of the variation in police expenditures between 
1950 and 1960. These factors explain somewhat less of the 
variation in police size and expenditures between 1960 and 
1970. The weaker relationship in the latter decade may be 
due in part to the unique social and economic conditions of 
the 1960s. For example, the economy moved from a period of 
stability to a period of decline in the mid-1960s 
(Michalowski and Carlson 1999). In the latter half of the 
1960s, manufacturing jobs diminished and minority workers 
were displaced (p. 225). The 1960s were also a period of 
social disorder, characterized by protests over the Vietnam 
War and civil rights. 
Changes in five of the social factors and the economic 
factor, as well as in the property crime rate, are 
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Table 2. Summary Table for Regression of Change in 
Police Size (number of police per 1,000 population) on 
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Civilian labor force 
Percent age 15-24 
Violent crime rate 
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significant predictors of change in the number of police 
between 1950 and 1960. Table 2 reveals a significant and 
positive relationship between changes in police size between 
1950 and 1960 and changes in percent nonwhite (beta= .242), 
median family income (beta= .188), number of families (beta 
= .171), percent with less than a fifth grade education 
(beta= .157), and the property crime rate (beta= .201). A 
negative and significant relationship exists between police 
size and population growth (beta= -.277) and the civilian 
labor force (beta= -.200). Table 3 indicates that changes 
in four of the same social and economic factors have a 
direct impact on change in the number of police between 1960 
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Table 3. summary Table for Regression of Change in 
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and 1970. Number of families (beta= -.404), population 
growth (beta= -.184), and civilian labor force (beta= 
-.105) are negatively related to police size. Change in the 
property crime rate, however, is replaced by change in the 
violent crime rate. Both percent nonwhite (beta= .167) and 
the violent crime rate (beta= .194) are positively related 
to police size. 
The results of the regression of change in police 
expenditures between 1950 to 1960 are somewhat similar to 
the analysis of change in police size for the same period. 
Table 4 confirms that changes in two of the same social 
factors, as well as in the property crime rate, have a 
significant effect on change in police expenditures between 
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Table 4. summary Table for Regression of Change in Per 
Capita Police Expenditures (standardized in 1967 dollars) 
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1950 and 1960. Change in population growth (beta= -.268) 
is negatively related to police expenditures; percent 
nonwhite (beta= .211) and the property crime rate (beta= 
.149) are positively related to change in police 
expenditures between 1950 and 1960. An additional factor is 
change in the violent crime rate (beta= .168) which is also 
positively related to police expenditures. Changes in both 
social factors are stronger predictors than either crime 
rate variable. 
Results of regression analysis of change in police 
expenditures between 1960 to 1970 differ from results of the 
previous analyses because no crime rate factor is 
significant. Instead, two social factors, percent nonwhite 
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(beta= .431) and number of families (beta= .195), are 
significantly and positively related to police expenditures 
between 1960 and 1970 (see Table 5). Change in the percent 
nonwhite has been a strong and significant factor in all 
four analyses, and is especially strong in predicting change 
in police expenditures between 1960 and 1970. 
Tables. summary Table for Regression of Change in Per 
capita Police Expenditures on Changes in Independent and 
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Other studies have found percent nonwhite to be an 
important determinant of society's response to crime, and in 
particular related to police size and expenditures (Jacobs 
1979, 1989, Jackson and Carroll 1981, Liska et. al. 1981, 
Greenberg et. al. 1985, Jackson 1986, Chamlin 1989, 1990, 
Liska et. al. 1999, Holmes 2000). Liska et. al. (1981) find 
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a strong racial composition effect in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Hawkins (1987) argues that nonwhites are perceived as 
particularly threatening. Spitzer (1975) suggests that the 
threat from "dangerous" classes is related to the size of 
the group and its degree of political organization. Blalock 
(1967) agrees, suggesting that nonwhites are more likely to 
be perceived as economic and political threats when they are 
a larger proportion of the population and mobilized. Liska 
and Messner (1999) conclude that percent nonwhite has a more 
consistent effect on crime control efforts than economic 
factors. The results of this investigation support that 
conclusion as well as the overall contention that perceived 
threats to the social order precipitate increases in formal 
social control. 
The direct effects of changes in the crime rate on 
changes in police size for both periods and on change in 
police expenditures between 1950 and 1960 were unexpected. 
The crime rate, however, has been significant in previous 
studies of the relationship between structural factors and 
punishment (e.g., Liska et. al. 1981, Liska and Chamlin 
1984, Chamlin 1989, McCarthy 1991, Hochstetler and Shover 
1997). Three other results require an explanation. First 
is the unexpected negative relationship between population 
growth and changes in police size and expenditures. This 
result suggests that population decline is a more critical 
factor than population growth in explaining formal responses 
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to crime. The number of cities experiencing a decline in 
population size increased from 6 percent in 1950 to 21 
percent in 1960 and to 32 percent in 1970. The decline in 
population coincides with changes in the composition of the 
city's population. American cities were transformed in the 
years following World War II when a growing middle class 
fled to suburban areas and left the urban poor and nonwhites 
behind. The perceived threat represented by these 
"dangerous" segments required a larger police force to 
protect business interests and to keep order in the central 
city. The civil disorders of the 1960s represented 
additional threats to the status quo. Police size and 
expenditures rapidly expanded in this period (Jacob 1982, 
Liska and Messner 1999). A second problem is the positive 
relationship between change in median family income and 
change in police size between 1950 and 1960. The third 
problem is the positive relationship between change in the 
number of families and change in police size between 1950 
and 1960 and also change in police expenditures between 1960 
and 1970. Both findings appear to provide greater support 
for the neoclassical economic perspective. Increases in 
income and number of families may have resulted in increased 
demands for police services in spite of the stability which 
both factors represent. Changes in family structure may 
offer another explanation for these findings. Such changes 
could represent a threat to the status quo. 
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Multivariate Contingency Tables 
The significant factors from the residual-change 
regression analyses have been examined to determine which 
years reflect economic stability/low or stable levels of 
social dynamite and economic decline/high levels of social 
dynamite. These factors tend to be more similar for 1950 
and 1960 than for 1960 and 1970. Thus, the break between 
the two time periods occurs within the 1960s. Selection of 
the specific year to differentiate the time periods is based 
on an examination of the national consumer price index for 
the years 1960 to 1970. The increases in the consumer price 
index which begin in 1967 are larger than in previous years 
in the decade and continue to the end of the 1960s and 
through 1978. Therefore, the years 1948 to 1966 are 
designated as the period of economic stability and the years 
1967 to 1978 as the period of economic decline. These 
designations correspond to Michalowski and Carlson's (1999) 
periods of consolidation and decay and Barlow et. al.'s 
(1995a) periods of expansion and decline. 
The two time periods are utilized in the investigation 
of the dependent variables which are available for the 10 
sample cities. A comparison of the dependent variable 
during the two time periods is presented in each 
multivariate contingency table. Each time period is 
examined when the crime rate is low and when the crime rate 
is high. The percentages for the low crime rate periods can 
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be compared to the percentages for the high crime rate 
periods. A similar pattern for both indicates that the 
crime rate is not responsible for the differences between 
the two economic periods. The propositions are valid only 
when the higher value for the dependent variable is 
accompanied by a greater percentage for the period of 
economic decline than for the period of economic stability. 
Chi-square values are used to identify significant 
differences between the two time periods. 
Police size and expenditures are examined first. The 
total crime rate is the control factor in the multivariate 
analyses. The mean value of the total crime rate (49.10) 
differentiates low and high crime rates. Substituting the 
median value (39.50) for the mean violates the expected 
frequency criterion for calculating chi-square. Table 6 
shows that a significant difference exists in police size 
between the two time periods regardless of the crime rate. 
The number of police is greater in the period of decline 
whether the total crime rate is low or high. 
Table 7 reveals similar results; police expenditures 
differ significantly between the two time periods when the 
crime rate is controlled. Per capita police expenditures 
are higher in the period of decline than in the period of 
stability. 
Multivariate analysis is not possible for the ratio of 
arrests to reported criminal offenses for total crime, 
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Table 6. A comparison of Police size in Periods of Economic Stability and Economic 
Decline 
Number of Police 
(per 1.000 population) 
1.72 or less 
> 1.72 
Total 






























,i:,. a • b • ~ Chi-square= 21.608; p < .001; Chi-square= 12.810; p < .001 
Table 7. A comparison of Police Expenditures in Periods of Economic Stability and 
Economic Decline 
Per Capita Police 
Expenditures 
(standardized 1967 $) 
$17.27 or less 
> $17.27 
Total 






























~ a • b • ~ Chi-square= 25.469; p < .001; Chi-square= 35.837; p < .001 
violent crime, or property crime because of the missing data 
on arrests for almost one-half of the years from 1948 to 
1978. The criterion regarding expected frequency size is 
violated when the crime rate is high: the chi-square value 
computed when the crime rate is low is not significant for 
total or property crime. The ratio of arrests to violent 
offenses when the crime rate is low is significantly 
different (p < .05) between the two time periods. This 
ratio is higher in the period of decline and lower in the 
period of stability. Thus, police activity directed toward 
violent crime when the overall crime rate is low is greatest 
in the period decline and least in the period of stability. 
This result supports the proposition that police activity 
will be greater during periods of economic decline. A 
bivariate analysis of arrests/offenses for violent and 
property crime reveals similar results. Table 8 permits 
Table a. A comparison of Arrests/Property Offenses in 
Periods of Economic Stability and Economic Decline 
Arrests/Property 
Offenses 
< 15 percent 
15 - 20 percent 
> 20 percent 
Total 


















the ratio of property arrests to property offenses in 
periods of economic stability and decline to be compared. 
The property offenses are limited to burglary, larceny, and 
motor vehicle theft. This ratio varies from 7 to 48 percent 
and the larger than expected ratio is due to the large 
number of motor vehicle thefts and the greater success of 
police in arresting these offenders (the maximum value for 
the ratio of arrests to offenses for motor vehicle theft is 
61 percent). Arrests/property offenses are significantly 
different in the two time periods, but in a different 
direction. The ratio is higher in the period of economic 
stability rather than in the period of economic decline as 
proposed. Police activity is less in the period of decline. 
Table 9 displays the results for the ratio of violent 
arrests to violent offenses. Violent offenses are limited 
to assault, homicide, and robbery. The ratio for arrest to 
Table 9. A Comparison of Arrests/Violent Offenses in 
Periods of Economic Stability and Economic Decline 
Arrests/Violent 
Offenses 
< 1 percent 
1 - 2 percent 
> 2 percent 
Total 


















violent offenses ranges from Oto 42 percent. The ratio for 
homicide and robbery are quite high; however, there are many 
more assaults than homicides and robberies and the 
arrests/assaults is quite small. Table 9 reports that 
arrests/violent offenses are significantly different in the 
two periods in the direction specified. The ratio of 
arrests to reported violent offenses is higher in the period 
of decline than in the period of stability. 
A second dependent variable, penalty severity, is 
available only for the 10 cities and also requires bivariate 
analysis due to the small number of cases. Changes in the 
severity of penalties for 11 offenses are examined at the 
state and local levels. The offenses are public 
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, 
prostitution, gambling, drugs (heroin, marijuana, and other 
narcotics), and weapons (firearms and other weapons). The 
number of changes made to state laws and city ordinances 
during each period are significantly different (p < .05); 58 
percent of the changes were made in the period of economic 
decline. Only about 51 percent of the changes in state laws 
increase or decrease the penalty for one of the 11 offenses. 
Of the 216 penalty changes in state laws, over one-half 
involve an increase in penalties for minor code revisions 
and 20 percent an increase in penalties for major code 
revisions. Table 10 shows a significant difference in state 
penalty changes between the two time periods. A 
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Table 10. A comparison of Penalty severity in state Laws 
in Periods of Economic Stability and Economic Decline 
Change in Penalty 



















larger percentage of penalties were decreased in the period 
of economic decline than in the period of economic 
stability, even though more penalties were increased during 
both periods. There are significant differences (p < .05) 
in the maximum penalty allowed by law between the two time 
periods. The maximum penalty allowed is more likely to 
include jail, fine or both and much less likely to specify 
both jail and fine in the period of decline. The maximum 
number of years specified for incarceration is more likely 
to be over five years in the period of stability and equally 
likely to be less than five, five to 25, or more than 25 
years in the period of decline. However, the amount of the 
maximum fine tends to be $5,000 or less in the period of 
stability and more than $5,000 in the period of decline. 
Fifty-eight percent of the changes in city ordinances 
involve changes in the severity of the penalty for the 11 
offenses. Table 11 reveals no significant difference in the 
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Table 11. A comparison of Penalty severity in City 
ordinances in Periods of Economic Stability and Economic 
Decline 
Change in Penalty 























direction of penalty changes in city ordinances between the 
two time periods, although there are significant differences 
(p < .05) in the maximum penalty allowed by law. The amount 
of the maximum fine is less likely to be over $500 in the 
period of economic decline than in the period of economic 
stability. Jail sentences are only specified in 43 percent 
of the changes in city ordinances; however, the maximum jail 
time is significantly more likely to be over 90 days in the 
period of stability and less than 180 days in the period of 
decline. 
The final multivariate analyses can be performed on 
media attentiveness to crime and valence of editorial 
content because the front- and editorial pages of a large 
number of newspapers (N=6,034) in the 10 cities were coded. 
Two measures of media attentiveness to crime, total crime 
news as a proportion of total news and total crime 
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editorials as a proportion of total editorials, are 
examined. Table 12 shows that the proportion of crime news 
differs significantly between the two time periods when the 
total crime rate is controlled. A larger percentage of 
front-page newspaper stories devoted to crime news appears 
in the period of economic decline than in the period of 
stability. Almost one-half of the newspapers contain more 
than 18.5 percent crime news on their front-pages in the 
period of decline. This increased focus on crime news on 
the front-pages of newspapers provides evidence of greater 
media attentiveness to crime during periods of economic 
instability. 
Although 97 percent of the newspaper issues contain an 
editorial and most between three and four editorials, only 
22 percent of all of the editorials are considered crime 
editorials. Table 13 presents the breakdown for editorial 
attention to crime--total crime editorials as a proportion 
of total editorials, controlling for the crime rate. The 
proportion of crime editorials differs significantly between 
the two time periods only when the total crime rate is low. 
A larger percentage of crime editorials appears in the 
period of economic decline. When the crime rate is low, 
editors address the topic of crime more in the period of 
economic decline than in the period of economic stability. 
This result supports the influence of social and economic 




Table 12. A Comparison of Front-Page News Stories Devoted to Crime News in Periods 
of Economic Stability and Economic Decline 
Percentage of Front-
Page News Devoted 
to Crime 
None 
1.00 - 18.50 
18.51 - 100.00 
Total 


































Table 13. A comparison of Editorials Devoted to crime News in Periods of Economic 





1 percent or more 
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~ Chi-square= 28.034; p < .001; Chi-square= 3.008; N.S. 















rate is high, editorial attention to crime is quite similar 
regardless of the economic climate. On the surface, this 
latter result may seem to challenge the proposition that 
media attention is greatest during periods of economic 
decline. Further examination of Table 13 reveals that the 
amount of editorial attention to crime is the about the same 
in periods of economic stability regardless of the crime 
rate, but is less in periods of decline when the crime rate 
is high. A larger percentage of editorials make no 
reference at all to crime in the high crime rate period than 
in the low crime rate period. If editors were responding to 
the crime rate alone, one would expect the reverse to be 
true--that editors would write more editorials about crime 
when the crime rate was high. 
The increasing number of missing cases as each of the 
five items on the editorial page is considered complicates 
analysis of the valence of crime editorials. Therefore, the 
content for the first item coded from the editorial page is 
analyzed. Twenty-five percent of the first item are coded 
as editorials (N=l,499). Most of the subjects of the crime 
editorials are crime incidents (31.5 percent), legislation 
(28.l percent), criminal justice agencies (13.5 percent), 
and proposed or adopted policy changes (13.5 percent). The 
crime editorials refer to the mayor (17.8 percent), police 
(9.2 percent), city officials (5.0), state officials (15.8 
percent), federal officials (18.4 percent), court officials 
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(7.1 percent), offenders (7.4 percent) private attorneys 
(0.8 percent), and victims (0.5 percent). The valence of 
these editorials (N=l,482) is displayed in Table 14. With 
the total crime rate controlled, the results reveal no 
significant difference in valence between the two time 
periods. Editors are most likely to take critical stances 
in editorials addressing crime issues regardless of the 
crime rate or economic conditions. A larger percentage of 
crime editorials are neutral in the period of economic 
decline than stability. Editors may drop the usual critical 
stance in an effort to support elite interests during 




Table 14. A comparison of the Valence of Editorials Devoted to Crime News during 

























8 Chi-square = 5.313; N.S.; bchi-square = 3.491; N.S. 


















CONCLUSZOHS AND ZMPLZCATZONS 
A nee-Marxist approach has been utilized to explain 
variation in local crime control strategies and media 
attentiveness to crime. I have argued that increased crime 
control and media attentiveness to crime result from 
perceived threats to the economic and social order by 
subordinate classes rather than from increases in the crime 
rate. The present study has extended past research by 
examining a larger number of cities over time, by using 
dynamic change measures for all variables and multiple 
measures of local crime control, and by including an 
ideological dimension to supplement the political and 
economic analysis. The entire analysis has required two 
separate methodologies. First, a panel design and residual 
change regression analysis were used to examine 396 cities 
from 1950 to 1970. This analysis permitted me to determine 
the effect of changes in social and economic variables on 
changes in police size and police expenditures. The second 
analysis was based on only 10 cities. Mulitivariate 
contingency tables were constructed to analyze·the effect of 
structural context on most of the local crime control 
strategies--police size, expenditures, and activity--media 
attentiveness to crime, and valence of editorials. A 
dichotomous independent variable representing economic 
stability/low levels of perceived threat and economic 
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decline/high levels of perceived threat was created for 
these analyses. Bivariate analyses were presented when 
there were too few cases to permit statistical control of 
the total crime rate. The analyses revealed that changes in 
social and economic factors signicantly affect changes in 
police size and expenditures, the ratio of arrests to 
violent offenses, and the proportion of crime news on the 
front-pages of newspapers. 
Overall, the findings of the present investigation 
provide support for the neo-Marxist perspective. In 
particular, the findings confirm that structural factors, 
independent of crime rates, significantly impact formal 
responses to crime. Although the regression analysis shows 
that the crime rate has a significant and positive affect on 
police size and expenditures, I still interpret the results 
as providing support for the neo-Marxist perspective. The 
results show that social and economic factors have an 
independent and stronger influence on police size and 
expenditures. Other studies such as Liska et. al. (1981) 
made a similar interpretation. Those structural factors 
which represent perceived threats to the social and economic 
order from disadvantaged segments of the population, 
especially nonwhites, have had the greatest impact. Limited 
support has been found for the measure of employment, 
civilian labor force, which is significant in the predicted 
direction only for changes in police size. Political 
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decision-makers seem most likely to increase police size and 
expenditures in response to population decline and increases 
in the percent nonwhite. Ideological support for the 
efforts of political decision-makers in times of economic 
decline derives from increased media attention to crime news 
on the front pages of newspapers. 
The model presented in Chapter 1 has been revised to 
reflect the findings of the present analysis (see Figure 2 
on the following page). As the revised model shows, percent 
nonwhite is positively related to police size and 
expenditures. Other social factors which are positively 
related to police size and/or expenditures are percent 
uneducated and median family income, as well as the violent 
and property crime rate. The civilian labor force and 
population growth negatively affect police size and/or 
police expenditures. One social factor, number of families, 
is positively related to police size in the earlier decade 
and negatively related in the latter decade. These factors 
are, for the most part, significant in the predicted 
direction. Only population growth, median family income, 
and number of families are not in the expected direction. A 
portion of the first two propositions were supported. 
Changes in social and economic factors affect changes in 
police size and expenditures, and in the ratio of arrests to 
reported violent offenses. Also supported is the 
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Figure 2. Theoretical Model Revised to Reflect Study Findings 
during periods of economic decline. Only partial support is 
gained for the proposition that the amount of crime 
editorials will be greater in the period of decline. The 
analyses do not support the proposition that the social and 
economic factors affect penalty severity or the ratio of 
arrests to reported property offenses. Also failing to 
receive support is the proposition that the valence of crime 
editorials will be more favorable during periods of economic 
decline. The model has been revised to show the positive 
effect of the crime rate on local crime control efforts. 
The data and analysis provide no direct measure of 
elite anxiety and thus we infer from the model that the 
social and economic factors represent threats to the social 
order and elite interests. Using structural context as an 
indirect measure of elite anxiety, we can conclude that 
perceived threats to social and economic stability 
represented by increases in the percent nonwhite and 
declines in the labor supply result in increases in the size 
of the police force and in law enforcement expenditures. In 
addition, a sharply rising consumer price index and a larger 
nonwhite population is associated with increased front-page 
coverage of crime. The political decision-makers respond to 
the increases in the perceived threat by hiring more 
officers and spending more money on law enforcement. The 
media support those efforts by directing greater attention 
to the crime problem. Additional research on the 
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perceptions of economic and political leaders at the local 
level would provide a stronger test of the model and reduce 
the criticisms of "teleological and tautological 
propositions" (Liska 1989, p. 86). 
The residual-change regression analyses of the 396 
cities lead us to conclude that changes in social and 
economic factors significantly affect changes in police size 
and police expenditures. Only one social factor impacts 
both dependent variables positively in both periods: change 
in the percent nonwhite. Three other social and economic 
factors--changes in population growth, number of families, 
and the civilian labor force--affect changes in police size 
in both periods. Change in police size between 1950 and 
1960 is also affected by changes in percent with less than a 
fifth grade education and median family income. Additional 
factors predicting change in police expenditures are change 
in population growth between 1950 and 1960 and change in the 
number of families between 1960 and 1970. Changes in the 
crime rate are significant predictors in three instances. 
Change in the property crime rate influences change in 
police size between 1950 and 1960; change in the violent 
crime rate affects change in police size between 1960 and 
1970 and change in police expenditures between 1950 and 
1960. The crime rate is never the strongest predictor. Two 
of the social factors, population density and percent age 
15-24, are not significant in any analysis. 
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Hochstetler and Shover (1997) suggest that previous 
levels of imprisonment are responsible for the low explained 
variance (R2 = .14) from their residual-change regression 
analysis of changes in imprisonment at the county-level 
between 1980 and 1990. The explained variance from this 
investigation is higher (R2 = .272 to .386), and inclusion 
of the previous levels of the dependent variables does not 
produce results as dramatic as those of Hochstetler and 
Shover. The increase in the explained variance is small for 
changes in police size (from .342 to .366 for 1950 to 1960 
and from .331 to .340 for 1960 to 1970) and in police 
expenditures for 1960 to 1970 (from .272 to .300). A larger 
increase in explained variance is found for change in police 
expenditures between 1950 and 1960 (from .386 to .443). The 
previous levels are significant predictors in all cases 
except for police size in 1960. All significant factors 
remain the same, except for the addition of change in 
percent age 15-24 which positively impacts change in police 
expenditures between 1950 and 1960. The previous level of 
the variable is never a stronger predictor than the social 
and economic factors already identified for police size 
between 1950 and 1960 and for police expenditures between 
1960 and 1970. Police expenditures in 1950 is a stronger 
predictor of change in police expenditures between 1950 and 
1960 than all factors other than percent nonwhite. 
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The multivariate contingency analyses of police size 
and expenditures in periods of stability and decline, while 
controlling for the total crime rate, substantiate the 
findings from the regression analyses. Police size and 
expenditures are greater in the period of economic 
decline/high social dynamite. The multivariate analyses of 
media attentiveness to crime has produced mixed results. 
Crime news receives greater media attention in the period of 
decline regardless of the crime rate. This conclusion 
confirms the work of Barlow et. al. (1995a), who found more 
crime articles during periods of high unemployment and 
periods of economic decline. We concur with Barlow et. al. 
that "conditions in the political economy are relevant to 
changes in news media representation of crime" (p. 196). 
Crime editorials, however, are more likely in the period of 
decline only when the crime rate is low. No difference 
between the two economic periods is detected when the crime 
rate is high. The crime editorials are as likely to be 
critical, favorable, or neutral in the two economic periods 
when the crime rate is controlled. 
The bivariate analyses of police activity and penalty 
severity also produce mixed results. Neither police 
activity nor penalty severity is more likely to increase in 
the period of economic decline/high social dynamite. More 
arrests per reported violent offenses and fewer arrests per 
reported property offenses occur in the period of decline 
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than in the period of stability. More changes are made to 
state laws and city ordinances in the period of economic 
decline. The changes in state laws are more likely to 
result in penalty decreases in the period of decline. 
Maximum penalties, whether fines or jail/prison sentences, 
are greater in the period of stability. Only the maximum 
fine allowed by state law tends to be higher in the period 
of decline. Change in control strategies rather than 
harsher punishment is more common during the period of 
economic decline; Barlow et. al (1995a) derive similar 
conclusions. Political decision-makers respond to the 
uncertainties of economic decline by making changes in the 
criminal justice system. 
The present empirical investigation contributes to the 
understanding of the relationship between structural factors 
and formal responses to crime. Those structural factors 
which pose threats to economic and social stability are 
partly responsible for the crime control strategies 
initiated by political decision- makers. This study reveals 
the benefits of a longitudinal analysis of local crime 
control efforts. The substitution of civilian labor force 
for unemployment and a range of local crime control 
strategies for imprisonment expand and support the labor 
surplus--punishment thesis. The analytical techniques used 
in the study have provided internal corroboration of the 
findings. A final advantage of this study is provided by 
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the inclusion of social, economic, political, and 
ideological dimensions in the examination of the impact of 
structural factors on local responses to crime. 
Limitations of the present study are due to the 
difficulties which arise from missing data, especially for 
1950 and on arrests. In addition, the reliance on 10 cities 
for the analysis of police activity, penalty severity, and 
media attentiveness to crime reduces the generalizability of 
the findings. And finally, some important variables are 
lacking because they are unavailable for cities for 1950 and 
1960 or on an annual basis which would be preferable to 
decennial data. An extension of this longitudinal analysis 
of city-level data would remedy some of these shortcomings. 
Census data in later years contain additional relevant 
variables on U.S. cities and more city-level data are being 
collected annually. The addition of the 1980-1990 data 
would add the third period, exploration, identified by 
Michalowski and Carlson (1999), and permit further 
comparisons with their findings as well as with others such 
as Hochstetler and Shover's (1997) study of county-level 
data from 1980 to 1990. The addition of several decades 
which do not contain a major war or economic depression 
would remove one limitation to the present study (Liska 
1987, p. 80). Further analysis of formal responses to crime 
at the local level can be supplemented with other control 
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